MDL and the Allure of Sidestepping Litigation by Erichson, Howard M.
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
MDL and the Allure of Sidestepping Litigation 
Howard M. Erichson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk






MDL AND THE ALLURE OF SIDESTEPPING 
LITIGATION 
Howard M. Erichson* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. “PEOPLE AREN’T INTERESTED IN DEPOSITIONS, AND      
DISCOVERY, AND TRIALS” ..................................................1289 
II. “THEY BELIEVE SETTLEMENT WILL BE MADE MORE LIKELY        
IF THE COURT ALSO CREATES A LITIGATION TRACK” ........1296 
III. “WHETHER PLAINTIFFS CAN PROVE ANY OF THESE 
ALLEGATIONS REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT THIS COURT   
HOLDS THAT THEY WILL HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY” ......1300 




 * Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to the University of 
Georgia and Professor Elizabeth Burch for hosting this symposium on the fiftieth anniversary 
of the multidistrict litigation statute, and thank you to Margaret Tomlinson for her research 
assistance. 
 
1288  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1287 
 
For a judge assigned to handle a mass dispute, the prospect of 
settlement may look more attractive than adjudication, and for good 
reason. Polycentric disputes do not lend themselves to adjudication, 
as Lon Fuller taught us long ago.1 Even leaving aside the special 
problems of polycentrism, adjudication is sometimes difficult and 
nearly always time-consuming, and adjudication forces all-or-
nothing frameworks onto issues better understood in probabilities 
than certainties. While public adjudication serves valuable 
functions, and the adjudication-versus-settlement debate has 
generated important insights in academic circles,2 it is fair to say 
that many lawyers and judges see settlement as the generally 
preferred outcome, especially in complex disputes. In federal 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) in particular, where the transferee 
judge is well-positioned to push mediation but lacks the power to 
adjudicate all of the constituent actions by trial,3 transferee judges 
often work hard to move the parties toward a negotiated global 
resolution.4 
Preference for settlement, however, does not render litigation 
irrelevant. On the contrary, litigation may provide disputants what 
they need to negotiate sensibly.5 Indeed, while neither litigation nor 
adjudication is itself necessary for settlement, the prospect of 
litigation and adjudication is essential. Disputants do not need 
adjudication to resolve their disputes, but they need a path to 
 
 1  See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-
404 (1978) (describing polycentric adjudications and the problems they present). 
 2  See, e.g., Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1117, 1118 (2009) (discussing “adjudication, settlement, and the relative advantages of 
each”). 
 3  See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (establishing transfer process in which transferee judges 
are designated to conduct “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”); Lexecon, Inc. 
v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (holding that the MDL 
statute authorizes only pretrial proceedings, and rejecting self-transfer by MDL judges as a 
ploy to try cases in the transferee court). 
 4  See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2004) (“One of the values of 
multidistrict proceedings is that they bring before a single judge all of the federal cases, 
parties, and counsel comprising the litigation. They therefore afford a unique opportunity for 
the negotiation of a global settlement. Few cases are remanded for trial; most multidistrict 
litigation is settled in the transferee court. As a transferee judge, it is advisable to make the 
most of this opportunity and facilitate the settlement of the . . . cases.”). 
 5  See, e.g., id. (noting that bellwether trials can promote settlement in the remaining 
actions). 
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adjudication if they are to achieve settlements that reflect the 
merits of their claims and defenses. 
This essay will use the opioids MDL to explore the allure of 
sidestepping litigation and the importance of providing a path to 
adjudication even when the judge views adjudication as a second-
best outcome. The judge overseeing the opioids MDL took an 
unusually aggressive pro-settlement stance from the start.6 The 
story of the first year of that litigation, told mostly in the judge’s 
own words, is instructive. 
I. “PEOPLE AREN’T INTERESTED IN DEPOSITIONS, AND DISCOVERY, 
AND TRIALS”7 
On January 9, 2018, lawyers crowded into a packed courtroom 
for the initial pretrial conference in the National Prescription 
Opiate Litigation.8 Judge Dan Polster of the Northern District of 
Ohio had been designated one month earlier by the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation to handle the coordinated proceedings in 
the burgeoning opioid litigation.9 The MDL mostly consisted of 
claims by cities, counties, states, and Native American tribes that 
they had spent massive amounts of money addressing the opioid 
epidemic, and that various participants in the pharmaceutical 
industry—including manufacturers, distributors, and retailers—
bear responsibility for improperly marketing and inappropriately 
distributing opiates.10 Plaintiffs had filed lawsuits in federal and 
state courts around the country against various combinations of 
pharmaceutical defendants11, and the federal court cases were 
transferred to Judge Polster pursuant to the multidistrict litigation 
statute “for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”12 
 
 6  See Transcript of Proceedings at 6, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-
02804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2018) [hereinafter Jan. 9 Transcript] (indicating that the MDL judge 
would rather not try the case). 
 7  Id. at 4.  
 8  See id. at 3 (noting that the courtroom was not large enough for all of the participants 
of the MDL). 
 9  In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL 2804, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379-80 
(J.P.M.L. 2017). 
 10  See id. at 1 (describing the plaintiffs’ claims that gave rise to the opiate MDL). 
 11  See id. at A1-A4 (listing the 64 actions that were consolidated into the opiate MDL). 
 12  28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
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Judge Polster welcomed the gathered lawyers and then wasted 
no time in telling them exactly what he wanted them to do. He 
wanted them to negotiate a settlement that would reduce the 
problem of opioid addiction and abuse. The judge explained the 
severity of the crisis and made it clear that the first order of 
business, as far as he was concerned, was for the parties to figure 
out ways to abate the crisis: 
What’s happening in our country with the opioid crisis 
is present and ongoing. I did a little math. Since we’re 
losing more than 50,000 of our citizens every year, about 
150 Americans are going to die today, just today, while 
we’re meeting.  
And in my humble opinion, everyone shares some of the 
responsibility, and no one has done enough to abate it. 
That includes the manufacturers, the distributors, the 
pharmacies, the doctors, the federal government and 
state government, local governments, hospitals, third-
party payors, and individuals. Just about everyone 
we’ve got on both sides of the equation in this case. 
The federal court is probably the least likely branch of 
government to try and tackle this, but candidly, the 
other branches of government, federal and state, have 
punted. So it’s here. 
So I don’t think anyone in this country is interested in 
a whole lot of finger-pointing at this point, and I’m not 
either. People aren’t interested in depositions, and 
discovery, and trials. People aren’t interested in 
figuring out the answer to interesting legal questions 
like preemption and learned intermediary, or 
unraveling complicated conspiracy theories.  
So my objective is to do something meaningful to abate 
this crisis and to do it in 2018.13 
One can understand the sentiment behind the judge’s 
announcement. Judge Polster appreciated the seriousness of the 
national opioid crisis. He had been handed the responsibility of 
 
 13  Jan. 9 Transcript, supra note 6, at 4. 
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overseeing the nationwide federal litigation over opioids. When life 
hands a person an opportunity to make a difference, one can 
squander the opportunity or one can try to do something. By virtue 
of the centrality of his role as MDL transferee judge, he had 
gathered in his courtroom representatives of many of the major 
players involved in the opioid situation, including pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, as well as state and local 
governments. As Judge Polster put it, “I mean, look around this 
room; an incredible amount of talent. I doubt if any judge has ever 
assembled this kind of talent ever.”14 And so he stated forthrightly 
what he believed was his moral duty and the shared duty of the 
gathered lawyers: “I think we have an opportunity to do it, and it 
would be an abject abdication of our responsibility not to try it.”15 
Judge Polster made it clear that when he said, “we have an 
opportunity to do it,” he was not talking about determining who was 
liable to whom. Rather, the it he was talking about was reducing 
the number of deaths from opioid overdoses: “But the resolution I’m 
talking about is really—what I’m interested in doing is not just 
moving money around, because this is an ongoing crisis. What we’ve 
got to do is dramatically reduce the number of pills that are out 
there and make sure that the pills that are out there are being used 
properly.”16 He drove home that the first item on his agenda was to 
reduce the flow of opioids into the wrong hands, and that “moving 
money around” was decidedly a secondary priority. “So that’s what 
I want to accomplish. And then we’ll deal with the money . . . . Okay? 
We don’t need—we don’t need a lot of briefs and we don’t need trials. 
They’re not going to—none of them are—none of those are going to 
solve what we’ve got.”17 
Even if the thought behind Judge Polster’s statement is 
understandable, it is a stunning statement from a judge, when one 
pauses to consider it. It is one thing for a judge to say that 
abatement of the crisis is an important goal, that the federal MDL 
has a role to play in achieving this goal, that the judge intends to 
manage the litigation in a way that furthers this goal wherever 
possible, and that ultimately a negotiated resolution may be the 
 
 14  Id. at 6. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. at 9. 
 17  Id. 
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best way to achieve this goal. It is quite another thing to forswear 
litigation and adjudication altogether.  
“People aren’t interested in depositions, and discovery, and 
trials.”18 Surely some are interested in depositions, discovery, and 
trial, aren’t they? Those who filed lawsuits asserting claims for 
relief probably fit in this category. “People aren’t interested in 
figuring out the answer to interesting legal questions like preemption 
and learned intermediary, or unraveling complicated conspiracy 
theories.”19 But what if the viability of the claims and defenses, on 
the merits, depends upon preemption or the learned intermediary 
doctrine or complicated conspiracy theories? If some or all of the 
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they demand, won’t it require the 
court to be willing to address legal questions? And if some or all of 
the defendants are not liable under the law, contrary to the 
plaintiffs’ allegations, again, won’t it require the court to be willing 
to address legal questions? If, for example, a defendant complied 
with federal law and a plaintiff’s state law claim is preempted, is 
this merely an “interesting legal question,” or is it basic to 
understanding whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to relief 
from a particular defendant? “We don’t need a lot of briefs and we 
don’t need trials.”20 Well, didn’t that remain to be seen? 
Judge Polster said that he would consider it a failure if he had to 
move forward with litigation and adjudication:  
[I]f I’ve got to do it in a traditional way . . . I’ll admit 
failure and I’ll say, All right . . .  and in 2019, I’ll try the 
Ohio case myself and see what happens, after dealing 
with whatever motions . . . . What that will accomplish, 
I don’t know. But I’d rather not do that.21 
 
 18  Id. at 4. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. at 9. 
 21  Id. at 5-6. Two days later, the court’s minute order asserted that the lawyers had 
reached a “consensus” at the initial conference to prioritize abatement of the crisis rather 
than litigation of the claims and defenses. See Minute Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate 
Litigation, MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Jan. 11 Order] (“The Court 
held an Initial Pretrial Conference with Counsel on January 9, 2018, at which time the Court 
solicited and obtained the consensus of Counsel to focus everyone’s present efforts on 
abatement and remediation of the opioid crisis rather than pointing fingers and litigating 
legal issues.”). The transcript of the January 9 conference does not so much reflect consensus 
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Again, it is worth pausing over the words, even as we understand 
the gravity of the situation and the urge to reduce harm. “What that 
will accomplish, I don’t know.”22 The judge is talking about motions 
and trials. What motions and trials accomplish, the lawyers in his 
courtroom might have thought, is adjudication of disputes on the 
merits. Cities, counties, states, tribes, and others allege that they 
have spent vast sums of money dealing with the epidemic of opioid 
addiction, and they assert that various participants in the 
pharmaceutical industry breached legal duties and bear liability for 
these costs.23 The defendants assert that they did not breach their 
duties and that they are not liable under the law.24 Aren’t the 
plaintiffs entitled to demand of the courts an adjudication of their 
claims? And, by the same token, aren’t the defendants entitled to 
demand of the courts a determination of whether they are correct 
that they are not liable for these harms? Of course it is possible—
indeed, likely—that most of the plaintiffs and defendants will 
resolve their disputes by negotiation rather than by adjudication. 
But does that mean that adjudication, or setting up a path to 
adjudication, would accomplish nothing? 
Judge Polster, however, was focused on one thing. The court 
promptly launched a track intended to help the lawyers focus on 
settlement. The minute order following the January 9 initial 
conference stated that the court would schedule a day-long 
information session and preliminary settlement discussion: 
“Counsel thought it would be beneficial to select a day for an 
information session to educate the Court and each other on supply-
chain dynamics and other issues relevant to resolving this MDL, 
and to further pursue settlement discussions.”25 The morning would 
be devoted to an exchange of information, and the afternoon would 
be devoted to “preliminary settlement discussions.”26 Again, Judge 
Polster left no doubt about where the lawyers should put their 
 
on this point as it does acquiescence by the lawyers in the judge’s clearly stated position. See 
generally Jan. 9 Transcript, supra note 6. 
 22  Jan. 9 Transcript, supra note 6, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 23  See Transfer Order, supra note 9, at 3 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ claims against the 
pharmaceutical industry). 
 24  See, e.g., County of Summit v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-op-45090 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 
19, 2018) (addressing various motions to dismiss). 
 25  Jan. 11 Order, supra note 21, at 1.  
 26  Id. 
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energies: “As Counsel are to focus their efforts on resolution, the 
Court hereby continues the moratorium on all substantive filings.”27 
Several weeks later, the court appointed negotiating teams—
seven lawyers to represent the plaintiffs, seven to represent the 
manufacturer defendants, four to represent the distributor 
defendants, and two to represent the state attorneys general, with 
the expectation of appointing others later to represent the 
insurers.28 The court ordered the teams to “work with the Special 
Masters and the Court to identify possible resolutions of economic 
and noneconomic issues in this litigation.”29 
The lawyers seem to have gotten the message loud and clear that 
they were to frame all of their requests and arguments in terms of 
advancing the settlement agenda. In the early months of the MDL, 
the biggest dispute concerned discovery of a database maintained 
by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).30 The 
DEA’s Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System 
(ARCOS) database contained detailed information tracking the flow 
of opioids from manufacture to sale. The plaintiffs urged the court 
to order that the information be provided, as the database could be 
useful for identifying suspicious sales and distribution patterns, as 
well as for determining market share of various manufacturers and 
distributors.31 But the lawyers seemed to bend over backwards to 
avoid framing their arguments in terms of anything that might be 
useful for litigating the claims. 
At a hearing on February 26, plaintiffs’ lawyer Paul Farrell 
explained the need for market-share data this way: “So when we say 
market share, it’s not merely identifying those that should sit at the 
table, but to have meaningful settlement discussions, also for an 
allocation of responsibility for the settlement proceeds based upon 
the conduct.”32 As to discovery of data regarding distribution of 
opioids, he argued, “with the distributors, what we are also 
 
 27  Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
 28  Order Regarding Settlement Negotiating Teams, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 
MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2018). 
 29  Id. 
 30  See Julie A. Steinberg, Opioid Plaintiffs Seek Data DEA Says Could Hurt Investigation, 
Bloomberg (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.bna.com/opioid -plaintiffs-seek-n57982088581/. 
 31  Id.  
 32  Transcript of Proceedings at 7, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., Doc. No. 155 
[hereinafter Feb. 26 Transcript]. 
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interested in is looking to see which distributors delivered which 
volume of pills to which jurisdiction. And again, for purposes of 
settlement, it allows us to understand for market conduct purposes 
which of the defendants are likely to be most culpable for purposes 
of discussing settlement.”33 
At the same hearing, attorney Alvin Emch, representing 
distributor AmerisourceBergen, argued that discovery of the 
ARCOS database (that is, discovery of detailed information on his 
client’s distribution of opioids) was unnecessary, and instead 
encouraged the court simply to invite any relevant distributors to 
participate in settlement negotiations.34 When Judge Polster 
suggested that the plaintiffs need to know about the distributors, 
Mr. Emch responded, “Well, respectfully, your Honor, that’s a 
litigation goal that the plaintiffs have. That’s a discovery goal.”35 
Implicit in Mr. Emch’s argument was that the parties were not 
permitted to seek discovery for litigation purposes – at least not yet. 
Just as Mr. Farrell understood that he had to frame his request for 
the data in terms of what was needed “to have meaningful 
settlement discussions,” so did Mr. Emch understand that his most 
effective argument would be one that accused the plaintiffs of trying 
to move forward with actually litigating their claims. Mr. Emch 
used “litigation goal” and “discovery goal” as if those were dirty 
words. 
But in trying to argue that discovery was unnecessary because 
the court could simply invite potentially responsible parties to the 
table, he apparently reached too far, and his exchange with the 
court is instructive. Mr. Emch reminded Judge Polster that the 
judge had urged everyone to focus on settlement rather than 
litigation. Mr. Emch said, “Well, a big part of what I'm saying to 
Your Honor is we don’t want to invite all of these other parties into 
the litigation. Litigation is about blame and fault and liability and 
pointing fingers. Your Honor saw that from the very beginning.”36 
Therefore, he argued, the court should simply extend invitations to 
 
 33  Id. at 7-8. During the same hearing, manufacturers’ liaison counsel Carole Rendon 
encouraged an approach that would answer questions “without increasing the risk of 
interlocutory litigation.” Id. at 65. 
 34  Id. at 31. 
 35  Id. at 32. 
 36  Id. at 33. 
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all of the identified distributors: “If we want to just have people to 
come to the table who can talk about their responsibilities and how 
better to meet those responsibilities, what the Court needs is the 
names of those parties that might be invited to come to the table.”37 
Judge Polster’s reply goes to the crux of the matter, and 
ultimately explains why Judge Polster’s exclusive focus on 
settlement was bound for failure. Judge Polster said, “they’re not 
likely to come, Mr. Emch, if they’re not named as defendants. Okay? 
I don’t think your client, in all fairness, would have just accepted 
someone’s voluntary invitation to come and be part of this.”38 
II. “THEY BELIEVE SETTLEMENT WILL BE MADE MORE LIKELY IF 
THE COURT ALSO CREATES A LITIGATION TRACK” 
Perhaps the hearing on discoverability of the ARCOS data was a 
turning point. Or perhaps the lawyers, in other ways, made it clear 
that litigation could not be avoided. At some point, Judge Polster 
apparently came to realize that he could not generate a negotiated 
resolution merely by the force of his own will, and that some 
litigation—and perhaps even adjudication—was going to be 
necessary. 
On March 6, after meeting with the negotiating teams, Judge 
Polster agreed to create a litigation track: 
On March 6, 2018, the Court met with the parties’ 
negotiating teams, liaison counsel and representatives 
of numerous State Attorneys General to discuss the 
status of settlement negotiations in this case. The 
parties reported important and substantial progress on 
several fronts, but also identified various barriers to a 
global resolution. To varying degrees, the parties agreed 
that the quickest way to surmount at least some of these 
barriers is to put into place a limited litigation track, 
including discovery, motion practice, and bellwether 
trials. 
 
 37  Id. at 34. 
 38  Id. Even as he acknowledged that productive negotiations may require discovery and 
actually naming distributors as defendants, Judge Polster still insisted that trial would be a 
failure. In the context of addressing whether information from the database would become 
public, he said not unless there was a trial, and “Hopefully there will be no trials.” Id. at 42. 
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Accordingly, the Court directs the parties to submit . . .  
their suggestions regarding the appropriate scope and 
timing of a litigation track and the contents of a case 
management order, including identification of test 
cases, sequencing of discovery, timing of motion practice 
(including issues related to remand), and any other 
relevant matters.39 
Still, the judge left no doubt that his goal was for the parties to 
reach a negotiated resolution.40 Importantly, however, he 
acknowledged for the first time in the opioid MDL that litigation 
may be necessary to move the parties toward such a resolution. Or, 
at least, he acknowledged that litigation may be “the quickest way” 
to do so.41 Thus began the actual litigation of claims in the opioid 
MDL, and it would include a schedule for discovery, motions, and 
trial in the Northern District of Ohio cases. 
On April 11, nearly four months after the Initial Transfer Order 
that assigned the opioid MDL to Judge Polster, the court finally 
issued Case Management Order 1 (CMO 1).42 CMO 1 still framed 
the need for litigation exclusively in terms of the goal of settlement, 
but even so, it established a framework for moving forward so the 
parties could begin to litigate the claims and defenses: 
The parties in this case have been pursuing, and are 
continuing to pursue, settlement discussions, and they 
have made good progress. The parties have indicated, 
however, they believe settlement will be made more 
likely if, in addition to the ‘settlement track’ they are 
currently pursuing, the Court also creates a ‘litigation 
 
 39  Minute Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 
2018). 
 40  Lest there be any doubt that Judge Polster continued to push the parties toward 
settlement, the Court on March 27, 2018 noted, “Pursuant to its case management and 
settlement facilitation role under Rule 16(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court 
has periodically met with the parties in this litigation to discuss various matters, such as a 
resolution of this litigation through settlement and the terms of a settlement proposal that 
would satisfy both the parties and the Court.” Order Regarding Settlement Discussions, In 
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2018). 
 41  Minute Order, supra note 41.  
 42  Case Management Order No. 1, Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. 
Ohio Apr. 11, 2018). 
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track.’ Accordingly, the Court hereby enters this Case 
Management Plan, which directs the parties to engage 
in motion practice, discovery, and trial preparation for 
certain cases in this MDL.43 
The court declared itself open to consider motions to dismiss and 
other legal matters by stating, “The parties and Court agree that it 
will be efficient and informative to proceed with briefing on 
threshold legal issues on common claims.”44 
The judge designated as Track One the three Northern District 
of Ohio actions, over which he had power to try the claims, in 
contrast to actions that had been transferred to him by the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.45 CMO 1 established deadlines for 
Track One written discovery, depositions, expert reports, and trial: 
“The Court intends to begin the trial at 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time on 
Monday, March 18, 2019, to last for a period of three weeks.”46  
The court emphasized the firmness of the trial date, even as it 
acknowledged some flexibility on discovery: “Please note that the 
granting of an extension of any discovery deadline shall not change 
the trial date, and the Court does not intend to move the trial date 
of the Track One case(s).”47 The lawyers, judge, and magistrate 
judges proceeded with the litigation,48 even as Judge Polster 
continued to insist that the litigation track is “not a substitute or 
 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs’ lawyers approved of the short trial deadline. See 
Jeff Overley & Emily Field, Opioid MDL Judge Sets Litigation Plan, Bashes DEA, Law360 
(April 11, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1009123/opioid-mdl-judge-sets-
litigation-plan-bashes-dea (quoting co-lead plaintiffs’ attorney Paul J. Hanly, Jr. saying, 
“We’re very pleased because trial dates tend to force settlement — that’s a truism in our 
world.”). 
 48  See generally Order Establishing Deposition Protocol, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate 
Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio June 20, 2018) (establishing protocol for depositions); Case 
Management Order No. 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio 
May 22, 2018) (establishing a detailed schedule for motions to dismiss); Case Management 
Order No. 3 Regarding Document and Electronically Stored Information Production Protocol, 
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2018) (establishing 
protocol for production of documents and electronically stored information). 
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replacement in any way” for a negotiated resolution that includes 
steps to reduce the opioids problem.49 
Notwithstanding the statement in CMO 1 that the court did not 
intend to move the Track One trial date, the judge subsequently 
pushed the date back twice: first by about six months,50 and then by 
another seven weeks.51 Perhaps the longer path to trial was 
inevitable in light of the complexity of both the factual discovery and 
the legal issues in the case.52 
  
 
 49  Transcript of Public Hearing, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. 
Ohio May 10, 2018); see also Emily Field, Opioid MDL Judge Says Litigation Track Is a 
Settlement Aid, Law360 (May 10, 2018, 8:33 PM), 
https://www,law360.com/articles/1038711/opioid-mdl-judge-says-litigation-track-is-a-
settlement-aid (“’It’s necessary to do [the litigation track], and we’re doing it, but it’s not a 
substitute or replacement in any way,’ the judge said Thursday. ‘I still am resolved to be the 
catalyst to take some steps this year to turn the trajectory of this epidemic down and rather 
than up, up, up.’”) 
 50  See Case Management Order No. 7 Setting New Deadlines for Track One Cases at 1, In 
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2018) (setting a new 
Track One trial date of September 3, 2019 because “[t]he parties unanimously requested 
extension of those deadlines and submitted various proposed schedules.”); see also Jeff 
Overley, Opioid MDL Bellwether Trial Postponed 6 Months, Law360 (Aug. 13, 2018, 8:26 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1072924/opioid -mdl-bellwether-trial-postponed-6-months 
(calling it “the latest sign that dreams of quickly resolving the epic legal battle may not be 
realized.”). 
 51  See Case Management Order No. 8 Setting New Deadlines for Track One Cases at 2, In 
re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. MDL 2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2019) (setting a new 
Track One trial date of October 21, 2019). In addition, on December 31, 2018, Judge Polster 
created a Track Two of litigation to expand the range of cases moving toward trial. See Emily 
Field, 2nd Bellwether Track Set in Opioid MDL, Law360 (Jan. 2, 2019, 5:13 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1114551/2nd-bellwether-track-set-in-opioid-mdl (reporting 
on Judge Polster’s selection of two cases for a second bellwether track). 
 52  See Overley, supra note 50 (“In a preview of Monday’s order, Judge Polster last week 
revealed that the local governments and opioid manufacturers had requested more time ‘so 
that the parties can complete the discovery necessary to present an intelligible trial.’”); Mike 
Curley, Bellwether Trial in Opioid MDL Delayed Another 7 Weeks, Law360 (Jan. 29, 2019, 
7:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123419/bellwether-trial-in-opioid-mdl-delayed-
another-7-weeks (“The governments and the defendants asked for the delay in a joint motion 
on Friday, saying the ‘modest extension’ would balance the need to get to trial with the 
interest in addressing discovery issues, which have been the subject of other delays in the 
pre-trial process, according to court documents.”). 
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III. “WHETHER PLAINTIFFS CAN PROVE ANY OF THESE 
ALLEGATIONS REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT THIS COURT HOLDS THAT 
THEY WILL HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY” 
On December 19, the court ruled on motions to dismiss in the 
Track One cases. With the exception of two aspects of the statutory 
public nuisance claims, Judge Polster determined that the plaintiffs 
could move forward with their claims.53 At the end of his opinion, 
the judge took the opportunity to express, in a rather personal way, 
the seriousness of the crisis: 
It is accurate to describe the opioid epidemic as a man-
made plague, twenty years in the making. The pain, 
death, and heartache it has wrought cannot be 
overstated. As this Court has previously stated, it is 
hard to find anyone in Ohio who does not have a family 
member, a friend, a parent of a friend, or a child of a 
friend who has not been affected. 
Plaintiffs have made very serious accusations, alleging 
that each of the defendant Manufacturers, Distributors, 
and Pharmacies bear part of the responsibility for this 
plague because of their action and inaction in 
manufacturing and distributing prescription opioids. 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have contributed to 
the addiction of millions of Americans to these 
prescription opioids and to the foreseeable result that 
many of those addicted would turn to street drugs. 
While these allegations do not fit neatly into the legal 
theories chosen by Plaintiffs, they fit nevertheless. 
Whether Plaintiffs can prove any of these allegations 
remains to be seen, but this Court holds that they will 
have that opportunity.54 
 
 53  See County of Summit v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-op-45090, slip op. at 38 (N.D. 
Ohio Dec. 19, 2018) (determining which claims could proceed and which could not). 
 54  Id. at 38-39. 
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To reach this conclusion, the judge ruled on numerous legal 
issues including the statute of limitations, civil RICO, civil 
conspiracy, public nuisance, and preemption.55 
Recall that one year earlier, Judge Polster had declared 
confidently that “[p]eople aren’t interested in figuring out the 
answer to interesting legal questions like preemption . . . or 
unraveling complicated conspiracy theories.”56 And here he was 
ruling on preemption and complicated conspiracy theories.57 
Perhaps people are interested in such legal questions after all. 
Judged against the goal stated by the judge at the initial pretrial 
conference, ruling on “interesting legal questions” may look like 
failure. But perhaps adjudicating such legal questions is precisely 
what must be done, in a complex dispute like this one, to move 
parties toward a realistic prospect of negotiating a resolution that 
reflects the merits of the claims and defenses. 
Recently, Judge Polster signaled that there will be no more trial 
delays. Ruling on a defense request to extend the deposition process, 
the judge stuck to his deadlines and ordered each side to designate 
ten priority expert witnesses.58 Significantly, he framed his ruling 
in terms of the integrity of the trial schedule: 
The Court has, on more than one occasion, moved the 
dates for the Track One trial back at the behest of the 
parties and declines to do so now or at any point in the 
future. The deadlines agreed to by the parties and 
ordered by the Court in CMO-8 will remain in place.59 
The transformation was complete. The judge who had insisted “we 
don’t need trials”60 had become a judge who insisted that trial would 
not be postponed for any reason. 
 
 55  See id. at *3-38 (discussing each legal issue). 
 56  Jan. 9 Transcript, supra note 6 at 4. 
 57  See County of Summit, slip op. at 2 (adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendations 
with regard to preemption); id. at 22 (“[T]he R&R concluded, and this Court agrees, that 
Plaintiffs adequately pled that Defendants shared a general conspiratorial objective of 
expanding the opioid market.”). 
 58  Order Re Expert Depositions, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. 
Ohio Apr. 10, 2019). 
 59  Id. at 2. 
 60  Jan. 9 Transcript, supra note 6, at 9. 
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IV. SETTLEMENT, LITIGATION, AND ADJUDICATION 
Judge Polster’s bold statement at the initial pretrial conference 
treated settlement and litigation-adjudication as opposites. He 
wanted the parties to negotiate a settlement; therefore, he did not 
want the lawyers to waste time litigating the claims and defenses, 
and he did not want the court to waste time adjudicating the claims 
and defenses.  
But settlement is not the opposite of litigation-adjudication. It is 
the product of it. Or, more accurately, settlement is the product of 
the possibility of adjudication, and the path to adjudication is 
litigation. For parties to reach a settlement, neither litigation nor 
adjudication is necessary, but a path to adjudication is necessary.61 
Litigation and adjudication matter to settlement in at least three 
ways: as information, as a guide for lawyers, and as risk that it gets 
resolved in settlement. It is thus the only thing that provides 
leverage in line with the merits. 
First, litigation and adjudication provide information to the 
parties and lawyers that enables them to think more clearly about 
settlement. This includes legal rulings such as Judge Polster’s 
decision on the motions to dismiss. It includes factual discovery such 
as the ARCOS database of opioid distribution and sales. And it 
includes trial verdicts as data points for parties to consider when 
negotiating a global settlement of the remaining claims, which 
explains Judge Polster’s conceptualization of Track One and Track 
Two actions as bellwether cases and also explains his stated desire 
that these cases be representative of the broader litigation. 
Second, a path to adjudication tends to align lawyers’ interests 
with clients’ interests in settlement.62 Agency risks are greatest 
when deals are negotiated by lawyers whose franchise existence or 
scope depends upon whether they succeed in striking a deal. 
Third, and most importantly, the very thing that is being 
negotiated is a resolution of the claims that the disputants are 
entitled to demand adjudicated. Without a threat that defendants 
 
 61  See Howard M. Erichson, Settlement in the Absence of Anticipated Adjudication, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2017 (2017) (explaining the importance of a path to adjudication as a 
foundation for settlement). 
 62  See id. at 2023 (discussing how the “path to adjudication sets the basis for achieving fair 
value in settlement” and also “reduces the problems of lawyer-client conflicts of interest in 
settlement negotiation”). 
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will be held liable, there is nothing to negotiate (leaving aside 
nuisance value). Without a threat that plaintiffs will lose, there is 
likewise nothing to negotiate (leaving aside transaction costs). The 
path to adjudication is the very thing that drives settlement. 
Significantly, this is not a binary proposition. Parties bargain in the 
shadow of litigation-adjudication. If a settlement is to reflect the 
merits of the claims and defenses, there must be a realistic path by 




 63  See id. at 2023-24; Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and 
Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 399, 401 (2011). 
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